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Over The Limit 
Usury laws, an ancient device for setting legal 
limits on loan interest charges, have recently 
reduced consumer-credit availability in states 
with low statutory ceilings. Their effect thus 
has resembled the impact of interest-rate 
ceilings on the supply of passbook-savings 
deposits. Below-market interest-rate ceilings 
on deposits-deposits being loans made by 
consumers to depository institutions-have 
induced consumers to shift their funds from 
low-yield passbook-savings accounts into 
financial assets paying a market rate of return. 
(The recent boom in money-market mutual 
funds exemplifies this trend.) Similarly, in per-
iods of  high interest rates, low fixed-rate usury 
ceilings have induced financial institutions to 
restrict their consumer lending in favor of 
other types of assets yielding a market return. 
Consumer creditthus has contracted as finan-
cial institutions in usury-law states have 
shifted their loanable funds to other markets. 
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA) 
represented an attempt to end low fixed-rate 
ceilings both on loans made by lenders to 
consumers (usury statutes) and on loans 
made by consumers to banks and thrifts 
(deposit ceilings). The provisions of the Act 
should reduce the likelihood, and severity, of 
the periodic consumer-credit crunches and 
deposit shortages caused by ceilings in the 
past. Following the trend started by the 
regulatory agencies' authorization of 
market-yielding money-market certificates in 
1978, the Act provided for a phase-out of 
deposit rate ceilings over a six-year period. 
(Last week, the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation Committee set a definite 
timetable for the phase-out.) The Act also 
preempted usury ceilings on mortgage and 
consumer loans, as well as on some small 
business and agricultural loans. 
Why ceilings? 
Usury, in its archaic form, referred to the act 
of charging interest for the use of money. 
-------------"---"--------"----------
Today, the payment of interest is taken for 
granted throughout most of the commercial 
world-except for countries like Saudi 
Arabia, where religious strictures prevai I 
against the practice. But even in the 
present-day United States, debates continue 
about the charging of "usurious" or 
"exorbitant" interest. 
Almost all American states have usury ceil-
ings of some type. These laws set maximum 
interest rates that lenders may charge on 
specific types of loans. The statutes typically 
"attempt to limit interest rates, fees, discount 
points, or other charges on loans to Indi-
viduals or small businesses. The ceilings may 
vary according to the type of lender-
commercial bank, thrift institution, finance 
company, mortgage company, or individual 
-or  they may apply to all lenders. Other 
factors-purpose of the loan, type of bor-
rower, and size of loan -may also determine 
ceilings. In modern times, however, most 
states have I  imited the use of  usury statutes to 
mortgages and consumer loans. 
Some states have set consumer-loan ceilings 
at a fixed rate. The state of Washington, for 
example, until quite recent months imposed 
a 12-percent ceiling rate. Some ceilings may 
be tied to a market-determined interest rate 
such as the Treasury bill rate-Washington'S 
new ceiling is four percentage points above 
the equivalent coupon yield on 26-week 
Treasury bills. Orceilings may be based on an 
administered rate, as in Alaska, where the 
ceiling is set at five percentage points above 
the discount rate charged by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
Legislatures typically have enacted usury 
ceilings to protect small borrowers, in an 
attempt to guarantee that available credit 
would be priced at a "reasonable rate." 
Supporters have argued that a legal 
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competition in lending markets-and from 
the stronger bargaining position held by 
lenders because of  their large size and easier 
access to information. Information on loan 
rates, maturities, fees, and repayment terms is 
costly for borrowe~s  to obtain, so that they 
cannot easily shop around to obtain the most 
favorable terms. Legislatures thus utilize 
ceilings to limit lenders' ability to turn 
possible bargaining advantages into high 
interest rates and fees.  In recent years, 
however, other legislation (such as the Truth 
in Lending Act) has aided consumers by 
standardizing the statement of contractual 
terms and by simplifying comparisons among 
lending agreements, thereby eliminating 
some of  the supposed need for usury statutes. 
Moreover, financial markets have become 
more integrated and competitive over time, 
so that consumers normally have many 
borrowing options available to them. 
Unintended effects 
When market-determined interest rates soar 
above statutory ceilings, usury laws 
admittedly limit the price of credit. However, 
ceilings also effectively limit the return to 
lenders, making certain loans unprofitable 
without affecting yields on other types of 
lending. Limited yields on consumer loans 
thus induce financial institutions to restrict 
their consumer lending and also to tighten 
credit standards on such loans. 
Banks in particular have available a wide 
array of lending opportunities, so that they 
can adjusttheir asset and liability portfolios in 
response to ceilings placed on consumer-
loan rates. For example, they may increase 
their lending to the business community 
(through direct loans or purchases of open-
market paper), to the government sector (via 
purchases of new securities), or to other 
commercial banks (through loans of funds in 
the inter-bank Federal funds market). In many 
cases, they lend such funds to out-of-state 
corporations, governments, or financial 
institutions. Or they may simply reduce their 
total lending and their managed liabilities 
accordingly. Because financial institutions 
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are able to alter their portfolio composition, 
state usury laws thus tend to limit the total 
amount of credit available to consumers 
within affected states. 
Ceilings also induce institutions to tighten 
their non-price terms of lending in order to 
reduce loan volume and to lower costs. To 
ration the dwindling supply of credit, 
institutions will tighten credit standards, 
allocate loans to existing customers, and limit 
maximum loan sizes. Also, as a means of 
reducing costs-especially loan losses and 
administrative expenses-institutions will 
allocate available credit to their most 
credit-worthy, low-risk borrowers. Thus, 
rather than insuring wide-scale availability of 
credit at artificially low rates, binding usury 
ceilings may simply guarantee availability of 
credit to the "best" customers. Borrowers 
who otherwise might qualify if institutions 
could charge above-ceiling rates will be left 
without credit. 
Some depository institutions with heavy retai I 
or consumer orientation may find it difficult 
to switch from consumer lending into other 
types of lending. Large investment in staff 
training, marketing programs, and lending 
faci I  ities -not  to mention legal barriers-
make it very costly for institutions to switch 
policy in this way, at least in the short-run. 
Institutions may be willing occasionally to 
take short-term losses on some loans in order 
to preserve profitable long-term relationships 
with "valued" customers. But now, with the 
high cost of new consumer deposits (espe-
cially money-market certificates), usury 
ceilings may make consumer lending even 
more unprofitable than in the past. 
Credit availability 
Recent large-bank data from the San Fran-
cisco (Twelfth) Federal Reserve District 
provide support for this analysis. From the 
third quarter of 1979 to the first quarter of 
1981 -a  period of generally very high 
market rates-outstanding consumer credit 
actually declined in states with usury-law 
limitations on consumer-lending rates. In other states, consumer lending continued to 
grow, even in the face of sluggish economic 
conditions, high interest rates, and the 
spring-1980 credit-control program. Usury 
ceilings may not account for all of this 
difference in states' growth patterns, but they 
undoubtedly explain a large part of it. 
In this 1979-81 period, total consumer loans 
at large banks in Washington, Oregon, and 
Idaho, where ceilings were wei! below 
market rates, declined at a S.l-percent 
annual rate. In dollar terms, their outstanding 
consumer loans fell from $3.7 billion to $3.4 
billion over this time-span, in quarterly 
average terms. Meanwhile, average con-
sumer loans at large banks in five other 
Western states without usury ceilings rose at a 
3.2-percent annual rate, despite all the 
negative factors affecting consumer markets 
atthattime. 
Usury-law changes 
Recognizing the perverse impact of usury 
ceilings on the availability of  consumer 
credit, Congress last year included several 
provisions in the Monetary Control Act to 
deal with this problem. First, the MeA 
preempted state usury ceilings on mortgage 
loans-unless states reinstate such ceilings 
by April 1, 1983. In contrast, the Act did not 
include an unlimited override of  state ceilings 
on consumer loans. Instead, it authorized 
insured state-chartered banks and thrifts-
national banks already had authorization 
-to  set consumer-loan rates at a maximum 
of one percentage point above the basic 
Federal Reserve discount rate. This 
represented only a partial solution to the 
problem, however, since the discount rate 
typically lags behind the market during 
periods of rising market rates. Moreover, the 
discount rate-as an administered, one-day, 
risk-free secured loan rate-is often well 
below market-determined rates. 
In light of this partial solution, state and 
Federal legislators have intensified their 
efforts either to rewrite usury statutes or to 
eliminate them altogether. Two Western 
states with rigid rate ceilings, Washington 
and Idaho, have just taken actions to 
liberalize their usury statutes, while the third, 
Oregon, is expected to do so soon. 
Recent and proposed legislative changes may 
result in higher fixed usury ceilings, variable-
rate usury ceilings or, in some cases, no 
ceilings at all. But in most cases, ceilings will 
now move with the market, rising and falling 
with the general level of interest rates. During 
periods of high interest rates, these changes 
will keep consumer credit from "drying up" 
as it did in the past. Moreover, a potential 
borrower who cannot obtain a loan at an 
artificially low rate may certainly prefer 
paying a higher rate to not  obtaining a loan at 
all. 
In a wider sense, elimination of consumer-
credit crunches should benefit not only con-
sumers but also business activity generally in 
affected states. Finally, the shift to floating-
rate usury ceilings, or even total elimination 
of ceilings, would be consistent with Con-
gressional efforts to decontrol interest rates on 
both consumer loans and deposits. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions)  . 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 



























6/10/81  Dollar  Percent 
- 333  12,673  9.3 
- 214  12,361  10.7 
350  4,487  13.4 
118  5,876  12.6 
30  - 920  3.9 
83  578  57.0 
- 18  78  1.2 
- 101  238  1.6 
- 923  - 2,596  - 6.0 
-1,355  2,893  - 9.4 
- 142  2,612  9.5 
- 312  16,069  25.1 
- 194  15,919  28.9 
- 393  8,009  35.3 
Weekended  Comparable 
6/10/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  - 73 
173  1 
n.a.  - 73 
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